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NOTES
CRASHING BY DESIGN:' TOWARD A UNIFORM
STANDARD FOR PUBLIC PLACE ANALYSIS
UNDER FEDERAL COPYRIGHT LAW
Adam Barrett Townshend*
Pay no attention to that man behind the curtain.
The Wizard of Oz
2
PROLOGUE
Harry "Sea Bass" Christmas was a chef and cinema buff whose
unsurpassed entrepreneurial spirit (and penchant for puns) led him
to open Dinner and a Movie, an eatery where patrons could watch
feature films while enjoying Harry's gastronomical delights. The idea
behind the restaurant was innovative in its simplicity. Hosts, dressed
like ushers, escorted patrons to individual booths, consisting of two
bench seats bordered by one wall that housed a video screen. The
other end of the booth remained open so that waiters, dressed like
movie stars, could serve the diners. The menu, styled after a theater
* Candidate forJuris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2005; B.A., English and
German, Bucknell University, 2002. All credit for this Note lies with my family. To
my Dad, Douglas, for continuing to be the best role model a kid could ask for, from
Little League through law school; my Mom, Susan, whose unparalleled resolve is a
constant source of inspiration; and my sister, Katie, whose sense of humor and
perspective remain invaluable-I thank you. I would also like to express my sincere
gratitude to Professor Joseph Bauer and the members of the Notre Dame Law Review
for their tireless efforts in bringing this piece to fruition. This Note received the 2004
Arthur Abel Memorial Writing Prize at Notre Dame Law School.
1 PETE TOWNSHEND, Crashing By Design, on WHITE CITY: A NOVEL (Atco Records
1985):
Nothing must pass this line
Unless it's well defined
You just have to be resigned
You're crashing by design.
2 THE WIZARD OF OZ (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1939).
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program, listed the tiles of available movies as suggested pairings to
ingeniously named dishes such as "On Her Majesty's Secret Sirloin"
and "The Lamb-Shank Redemption." After taking a patron's order,
waiters retrieved the selected feature from Harry's vault and inserted
it into a DVD player installed at each table. Diners proceeded to en-
joy the film of their choice, which proved to be a welcome distraction
from the restaurant's often sub-par cuisine.
Harry's lack of culinary skill notwithstanding, Dinner and a Movie
received rave reviews from the local press. One critic, impressed with
the freshness of Harry's food, described how "the steak still had marks
from where the jockey was hitting it!"'3 The restaurant's popularity
and the sheer length of each guest's dining experience made reserva-
tions difficult to come by. On one particular Friday evening, Harry,
ever the business-savvy owner, decided to wait tables himself. He
served a young man and an older woman, new to the area, who or-
dered spaghetti ("Pasta La Vista, Baby"), cocktails ("Muppets Take
Manhattan") and "Pulp Fiction" as their movie of choice. Having
served their cocktails, Harry placed the couple's film in the DVD
player and pressed the play button. He complimented the young
man, whispering "Oh, this is your wife, huh? A lovely lady. She must
have been something before electricity!"4
Suddenly, the young man pulled out a gun, yelling "Everybody be
cool, this is an arrest for an unlawful public performance under 17
U.S.C. § 106!" The woman stood up, pistol in hand, screaming, "Any
of you patrons move and I'll execute every ... last one of you! Got
that?"5 The couple, law enforcement officials in disguise, handcuffed
Harry and led him to their paddy wagon. The next day, city officials
took a wrecking ball to Dinner and a Movie and, likewise, to Harry's
dreams. 6
INTRODUCTION
A clearly defined public place standard under the current version
of the Copyright Act 7 might have preserved Harry Christmas's inven-
tive vision. Vague legislative drafting interpreted by seemingly irrec-
oncilable judicial opinions leaves the definition of a public place for
the purposes of copyright infringement analysis in a state of disrepair,
3 CADDYSHACK (Orion Pictures 1980).
4 Id.
5 See PuLP FICrION (Miramax Films 1994).
6 This is a fictional hypothetical. Similarity to any event, actual or fictitious, is
purely coincidental.
7 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
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especially at its fringes. Common sense intuitions of what constitutes
a public place are often ineffective in resolving peculiar factual situa-
tions, and judges have little else to guide them in defining when a
performance is public under 17 U.S.C. § 106. The result has been an
assortment of apparently conflicting opinions that do not further a
reasoned, comprehensive public place standard. It is the purpose of
this Note to reconcile the language of the Copyright Act with concom-
itant case law to provide a three-pronged test against which courts can
measure factual situations to determine whether a performance is
public. Part I of this Note will track the public performance right as it
evolved from its pre-colonial form to its current incarnation in the
Copyright Act. Part II will introduce relevant case law interpreting the
public performance right in a particular factual situation. Part III will
resolve the apparent discrepancies amongst these cases and introduce
a three-pronged test, implied in each of these decisions, to determine
whether a place is open to the public for the purposes of copyright
infringement analysis. Part IV applies this standard to the existing
case law and suggests ways in which Harry Christmas might have built
his restaurant to prevent such an awkward and embarrassing scene.
I. STATUTORY DEVELOPMENT OF THE PUBLIC PERFORMANCE RIGHT
A. Early Statutory Incarnations of the Public Performance Right
The right of public performance specifies that "the copyright
owner [for a particular artistic work] has the exclusive right to per-
form the work publicly."8 While the sheer variety of media encom-
passed by the public performance right has expanded over time, the
basic notion that the copyright owner holds the right to publicly per-
form a given work is a concept that accompanied the Founding of the
United States.
Long before the passage of the first Copyright Act in 1909,9 the
Continental Congress laid the logical foundation from which the
modem public performance right emerged. A congressional
committee
recommended to the several States, to secure to the authors or pub-
lishers of any new books not hitherto printed.., the copy right of
such books for a certain time not less than fourteen years from the
8 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.14[A]
(2003).
9 Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075, repealed by Copyright Act of 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541.
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first publication ... such copy or exclusive right [consisting] of
printing, publishing and vending the same .... 10
Several states, acting on this congressional recommendation, en-
acted legislation creating a copyright for the owners of literary
works.'1 State legislatures demonstrated a general agreement that the
policy for such copyrights was to secure for authors and publishers the
financial benefits of literary works, thereby encouraging artistic en-
deavors that enriched and benefited public life. 12 For example, as
early as 1783, the Massachusetts legislature noted that
the progress of civilization, the public weal of the community, and
the advancement of human happiness, greatly depend on the ef-
forts of learned and ingenious persons in the various arts and sci-
ences: As the principal encouragement such persons can have to
make great and beneficial exertions of this nature, must exist in the
legal security of the fruits of their study and industry to
themselves. 1
3
This basic literary copyright and its attendant policy served as
wellsprings for more complicated copyright statutes. 14 Initially, the
copyright protection afforded literary works encompassed similar me-
10 JOURNAL OF THE UNITED STATES IN CONGRESS ASSEMBLED, CONTAINING THE PRO-
CEEDINGS FROM Nov. 1782 TO Nov. 1783, at 256-57 (Philadelphia, C.D. Claypoole,
1783).
11 See Act of Jan. 8, 1783, 1783 Conn. Pub. Acts 617, 617 (stating "[t]hat the au-
thor of any book or pamphlet not yet printed, being an inhabitant or resident in these
United States, and his heirs and assigns, shall have the sole liberty of printing, publish-
ing and vending the same within this State, for the term of fourteen years, to com-
mence from the day of its first publication in this state"); see also Act of Mar. 15, 1784,
ch. 124, 1784 Pa. Laws 182 (providing the author of a literary work the exclusive right
to print, reprint and public his work, and stating that "if any person ... shall presume
to print, publish, vend, or distribute any such book or pamphlet within this State ...
without the consent of the author thereof first lawfully obtained, every such per-
son . . . shall forfeit and pay to the author . . .double the value of all the copies of
such book or pamphlet so printed.").
12 See, e.g., Act of Jan. 8, 1783, 1783 Conn. Pub. Acts at 617 (stating that "every
author should be secured in receiving the profits that may arise from the sale of his
works, and such security may encourage men of learning and genius to publish their
writings; which may do honor to their country, and service to mankind"); Act of May
27, 1783, ch. 21, 1783 N.J. Laws 47 (noting that "learning tends to the ... general
good of mankind; and as [such,] .. .men of learning who devote their time and
talents to the preparing of treatises for publication, should have the profits that may
arise from the sale of their works secured to them").
13 Act of Mar. 17, 1783, ch. 26, 1783 Mass. Acts 236, 236.
14 See infra Part I.C.
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dia which could likewise be printed and copied.' 5 Three considera-
tions have forced legislatures to engage in increasingly complicated
applications of copyright theory: (1) the advent of technology al-
lowing for new artistic media;' 6 (2) an increased recognition that
these artistic endeavors are beneficial to the public and, under the
established policy, worthy of copyright protection;17 and (3) the reali-
zation that these works could be put to various uses, thereby ex-
panding both the number and nature of the rights bundled with a
given copyright. 18 As time progressed, copyright statutes both encom-
passed a wider variety of media and afforded the owner a wider variety
of rights.1 9 In 1856, Congress established the first public performance
right when it amended the existing copyright acts to protect dramatic
compositions designed or suited for public presentation. 20 The pub-
lic performance right, in this incarnation, consisted of
the sole right ... to act, perform, or represent the [dramatic com-
position], or cause it to be acted, performed, or represented, on any
stage or public place during the whole period for which the copy-
right is obtained; and any manager, actor, or other person acting,
performing, or representing the said composition, without... the
consent of the said author or proprietor . . . shall be liable for
damages.
21
Just as the literary right and policy promoted by the First Conti-
nental Congress served to facilitate protection for like media that
could be printed or copied, the public performance right for dramatic
works tendered by the Thirty-Fourth Congress acted as a catalyst for
15 For example, photographs were protected from being copied or printed. See
Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 126, 13 Stat. 540.
16 SeeJulien H. Collins III, Note, When In Doubt, Do Without: Licensing Public Per-
formances l Nonprofit Camping or Volunteer Service Organizations Under Federal Copyright
Law, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 1277, 1287 (1997) (stating that "further advances in technol-
ogy[] caused .. . clarification and revision" of copyright law).
17 See Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1, 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)
(declaring that "copyright law celebrates the profit motive, recognizing that the incen-
tive to profit from the exploitation of copyrights will redound to the public benefit by
resulting in the proliferation of knowledge").
18 SeeJoseph P. Liu, Owning Digital Copies: Copyright Law and the Incidents of Copy
Ownership, 42 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1245, 1315 (2001) (arguing that "the primary limits
on the scope of copyright law come from the need to reduce transaction costs associ-
ated with licensing uses of the work").
19 See, e.g., Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 36, 2 Stat. 171 (extending the benefits of
copyright protection to engravings and prints and protecting reproduction rights); see
also Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436 (extending copyright protection to musical
compositions and protecting their reproduction rights).
20 See Act of Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 138.
21 Id. at 139.
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measures protecting other public performance media, including liter-
ary works and musical compositions. 22 Vital to the scope of this pro-
tection, however, are definitions of "performance" and "public." The
drafters of these early statutes, possibly assuming that the courts would
apply common sense to facts lying before them, failed to provide a
concrete statutory definition of either term. These omissions laid the
groundwork for future problems.
B. The Public Performance Right Under the Copyright Act of 1909
In 1909, Congress provided an authoritative amendment to and
consolidation of acts respecting copyright. The Copyright Act of 1909
(1909 Act) reformed several areas of copyright law, ultimately tilting
the scales towards creators' rights. 2 3 A clarification of the public per-
formance right stood amongst these revisions. Under the 1909 Act,
owners of nondramatic literary works including lectures, sermons, and
addresses had the exclusive right to "deliver or authorize the delivery
of the copyrighted work in public for profit."24 Additionally, the 1909
Act afforded owners of dramatic works the exclusive right to "perform
or represent the copyrighted work publicly."25 Finally, the owner of a
musical composition had the exclusive right to "perform the copy-
righted work publicly ... for the purpose of public performance for
profit."26 The public performance right in the 1909 Act, similar to its
prior manifestations, added one significant requirement: the perform-
ance had to be for profit to infringe the public performance right.
This added condition, however, did not change the necessity for ascer-
taining exactly what constituted a performance in "public."
Although Congress fashioned the 1909 Act as a comprehensive
statement of existing copyright law, Title 17 contained the noticeable
absence of a standard by which to determine whether a performance
was "public" for the purposes of copyright infringement analysis. The
common sense boundaries for public place analysis under the 1909
Act were easily identifiable. That is, performances limited to family
members and invited guests were never public, while performances
open to the public at large, involving a gathering of a substantial num-
22 See Act of Jan. 6, 1897, ch. 4, § 4966, 29 Stat. 481, 481.
23 Changes in the 1909 Act included extending the length of copyright terms to
fifty-six years and changing the definition of controlled activities from "printing" to
"copying" in response to creators' anxieties about the invention of mechanical record-
ing devices. See Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (codified at 17 U.S.C.
§ 1 (1970)) (repealed 1976).
24 17 U.S.C. § 1(c) (1970).
25 Id. § 1(d).
26 Id. § l(e).
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ber of persons outside the family, were nearly always public.27 Be-
tween these two poles, however, lay a gray area in which the lack of a
meaningful standard fostered uncertainty and divergence as to
whether a performance was indeed "public."
Take, for instance, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Distributing Corp. v. Wy-
att.28 The disputed performances in Wyatt involved films shown in a
private yacht club to which only club members and their invited guests
could gain entrance. 29 Based on these relatively straightforward facts,
Judge Coleman articulated the issue as follows: "Was the performance
of these films here in question public, as that word is to be understood
in [the 1909 Act]?" 3 The court felt "constrained to the conclusion
that it was not a public showing as contemplated by the law." 31 The
yacht club, the court reasoned, was not one "to which the public, as
long as they behaved themselves and paid the price, were entitled to
have entrance and to hear and see whatever form of entertainment
was given." 32 Wyatt, then, defined a "public place" narrowly under the
1909 Act as one which offered entrance to anyone, without restriction.
Any constraint on admission necessarily purged the "publicness" from
a particular place. After Wyatt, it appeared that performances at
places with even the most modest restrictions on admission were pri-
vate and noninfringing under the 1909 Act.
Consider, in contrast, the conception of "publicness" in Porter v.
Marriott Motor Hotels, Inc.33 The dispute in Porter arose out of a copy-
right infringement suit brought after copyright owners (including
famed American songwriter Cole Porter) learned that the Sirloin &
Saddle Club, located in a Marriott Motor Hotel, was playing their
compositions. 34 According to the court, entrance to the club was lim-
ited to hotel lodgers and their invited guests. 35 The copyright owners
argued, however, that despite the club's express limitation on the
composition of its audience, it was a public place operating for profit,
27 See Lerner v. Schectman, 228 F. Supp. 354, 355 (D. Minn. 1964) (suggesting
that performances theoretically open to the general public are always public perform-
ances under the 1909 Act); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Distrib. Corp. v. Wyatt, 21 C.O.
Bull. 203 (D. Md. 1932) (stating that under the 1909 Act, performances were never
public as long as audiences were limited to a particular group rather than the general
public).
28 Wyatt, 21 C.O. Bull. at 203.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 204.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 205.
33 137 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 473 (N.D. Tex. 1962).
34 Id. at 474.
35 Id. at 473-74.
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thereby infringing on copyrights when it performed particular
songs.36 Under Wyatt, a performance was never public as long as the
audience was limited to a particular group rather than the general
public, no matter how large the composition of the group. Given es-
tablished authority, then, it seems as though the result in Porter should
have been clear: playing C'est Magnifique and I Could Have Danced All
Night at the Sirloin & Saddle Club was not a public performance for
the purposes of copyright infringement analysis under the 1909 Act.
The Porter court, however, reached the opposite conclusion, holding
that "[t]he Sirloin & Saddle Club ... is . . . a 'public place' operated
'for profit' wherein 'public performances for profit' of musical com-
positions occur."
37
Attempting to reconcile decisions such as Wyatt and Porter dem-
onstrates the 1909 Act's inherent problems. While it is apparent,
given the relative dearth of opinions dealing with the subject, that the
statute did not suffer from the lack of a definition for "performance,"
the absence of a concrete public place standard rendered copyright
infringement analysis difficult under the 1909 Act.
C. The Public Performance Right Under the Copyright Act of 1976
In 1976, after consideration dating back to the early 1960s, Con-
gress undertook the first massive reform of the Copyright Act since
1909.38 This expansion contains the modifications that remain in ef-
fect today. The revision, designed to address the impact of new tech-
nology39 and bring domestic law into accord with international law,
appears to recognize that the lack of a specific public place standard
generated difficulties in defining the scope of the public performance
right. Thus, the Copyright Act of 1976 (1976 Act) contained substan-
tial revisions to the public performance right.
While amendments to the 1909 Act gradually increased the vari-
ety of media to which the exclusive right of public performance ap-
plied,40 the 1976 Act further expanded coverage to include motion
36 Id. at 474.
37 Id.
38 Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified at 17 U.S.C.
§§ 101-803 (2000)).
39 Technological advancements that Congress addressed in the 1976 revision in-
cluded video recording and photocopying.
40 See Sound Recording Amendment Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391
(extending limited copyright protection to sound recordings "for the purpose of pro-
tecting against unauthorized duplication and piracy"); Act ofJuly 31, 1939, ch. 396, 53
Stat. 1142 (extending copyright protection to "prints and labels used for articles of
[VOL. 79:52052
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pictures and audiovisual works.4' The 1976 Act extended to copyright
owners the right to perform "literary, musical, dramatic and choreo-
graphic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovi-
sual works" in public.4 2
The language of the Act makes clear that, like incarnations of the
public performance right dating back to the eighteenth century, the
scope of the public performance right is dictated by the definition of a
public place. Jobete Music Co. v. Johnson Communications, Inc.43 supports
this concept, noting that
[t]o establish a claim for copyright infringement ... by means of
public performance, a claimant must prove: (1) the originality and
authorship of a composition; (2) a valid copyright under the formal-
ities of the [1976 Act]; (3) [the] claimant's ownership of the copy-
right at issue; (4) defendant's public performance of the composition; and
(5) defendant's failure to obtain permission from the claimant for
such performance. 4
4
The conjunctive structure of the Jobete Music factors connotes that
the public nature of a performance is necessary to finding infringe-
ment. If the boundaries of the public performance right are defined
by the instances in which it is infringed, then, both copyright owners
and potential infringers must rely on the definition of public to guide
their behavior.
In contrast to earlier copyright enactments, the 1976 Act provides
some guidance for determining when a performance is deemed pub-
lic for the purposes of 17 U.S.C. § 106. There are three ways to deter-
mine whether a performance for purposes of the 1976 Act is public:
(1) the performance can be transmitted;45 (2) the performance may
occur "at any place where a substantial number of persons outside of a
normal circle of family and its social acquaintances is gathered";46 or
(3) the performance may occur at a place open to the public.4 7
Unlike its predecessors, the 1976 Act provides a clear path to de-
termine whether a copyrighted work has been "performed." Section
101 states:
merchandise"); Act of Aug. 24, 1912, ch. 356, 37 Stat. 488 (extending copyright pro-
tection to "motion-picture photoplays" and "motion pictures other than photoplays").
41 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2000).
42 Id.
43 285 F. Supp. 2d 1077 (S.D. Ohio 2003) (emphasis added).
44 Id. at 1082 (emphasis added).
45 See 17 U.S.C. § 101.
46 Id.
47 Id.
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To "perform" a work means to recite, render, play, dance, or act it,
either directly or by means of any device or process or, in the case of
a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to show its images in
any sequence or to make the sounds accompanying it audible. 48
The verbosity of this definition belies its basis in common sense,
as a performance is essentially any "act by which [a] rendition or
showing [of the work] is transmitted or communicated to the pub-
lic."'49 This includes "reading a literary work aloud... [playing a work
on] equipment for reproducing... sounds or visual images... [and]
showing portions of a motion picture" sequentially, although in no
particular order.
'50
Having established when a performance takes place, the next de-
termination that must be made is whether that performance is public.
At this point, the 1976 Act provides more assistance than any of its
predecessors, providing three express situations in which a perform-
ance is deemed to be public.51 This Note is primarily concerned with
the third.
First, the Act plainly states that
[t]o perform or display a work "publicly" means ... (2) to trans-
mit... a performance... of the work to a place [open to the public
or to any place where a substantial number of persons outside of a
normal circle of family are gathered], by means of any device or
process, whether the members of the public capable of receiving
the performance or display receive it in the same place or in sepa-
rate places and at the same time or at different times. 52
Simply put, "[t]o 'transmit' a performance ... is to communicate
it by any device or process whereby images or sounds are received
beyond the place from which they are sent."53 Unless the transmis-
sion is determined to fall under the exceptions in 17 U.S.C. §§ 110
48 Id.
49 H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, pt. 1, at 63 (1976).
50 Id.
51 Under section 101, to perform a work publicly means
(1) to perform or display it at a place open to the public or at any place where a
substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social
acquaintances is gathered, or
(2) to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of the
work to a place specified by clause (1) or to the public, by means of any
device or process, whether the members of the public capable of receiving
the performance or display receive it in the same place or in separate places
and at the same time or at different times.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added).
52 Id. (emphasis added).
53 Id.
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and 111,54 then, a transmission of a protected work by the terms of
this definition is always a public performance that infringes on the
exclusive right set forth in 17 U.S.C. § 106. A common situation in
which courts define a transmission as a public performance occurs
when the performance of a particular work is dispersed from a central
site to remote locations. 55 While just how far beyond the central site
the dispersal must travel to qualify as a "transmission" is an issue in
itself, it is a secondary concern for the purposes of this Note. Thus,
"[w] hat is clear is that if a transmission is found to have occurred, a
public performance will be deemed to have taken place regardless of
location." 5
6
Second, the 1976 Act specifies that a performance is deemed "in
public" if it takes place "at any place where a substantial number of
persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social acquaint-
ances is gathered."57 This definition of a public place is designed to
deal with situations in which a performance transpires at a place not
"open to the public" (i.e., a country club) but in the presence of a
substantial number of persons not bound by traditional social ties of
family or friendship. 58 Although Congress did not identify the thresh-
54 Sections 110 and Ill provide the circumstances purging the "publicness" from
a particular performance even if it is "transmitted" under the statutory definition. See,
e.g., id. § 110(1) (declaring that performances in nonprofit educational institutions
are not public); id. § 110(3) (declaring that performances in the course of religious
worship are not public); id. § 110(6) (declaring that performances by nonprofit agri-
cultural or horticultural organizations are not public); see also id. § 111 (purging cer-
tain secondary transmissions of their publicness).
55 See, e.g., Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm't, Inc., 192 F. Supp. 2d
321 (D.N.J. 2002), affd, 342 F.3d 191 (3d Cir. 2003) (finding a public performance
when remote Internet users clicked on Internet icon, thereby accessing video clips
from the defendant's central website).
56 John Kheit, Public Performance Copyrights: A Guide to Public Place Analysis, 26
RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1, 17 (1999).
57 17 U.S.C. § 101. Congress expressly intended this common sense definition of
a public place "to make clear that, contrary to the decision in [ Wyatt], performances
in 'semipublic' places such as clubs, lodges, factories, summer camps, and schools are
'public performances' subject to copyright control." H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, pt. 1, at
65 (1976).
58 Courts seem to disagree over the required strength of the social bond among a
substantial gathering of individuals to render a performance private. Compare Diag-
nostic Unit Inmate Council v. Motion Picture Ass'n of Am., 953 F.2d 376, 379 (8th
Cir. 1992) (noting that "the [gathering of inmates at a prison] may constitute an
exception to the copyright law's proscriptions for public performance"), with Diag-
nostic Unit Inmate Council v. Films Inc., 88 F.3d 651, 654 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing the
district court's conclusion that prison showings are public performances).
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old at which a "substantial number of persons" gather, the courts have
established more concrete numbers. 59
Finally, the 1976 Act dictates that a performance is public if it
occurs "at a place open to the public."60 Unfortunately, the definition
of "open to the public" is devoid of the specificity that renders the
"transmission" and "substantial number of persons" clauses moder-
ately successful. Instead, Congress defines space "open to the public"
as "a public place ' 61 and an area open "to the public at large."62 The
circular reasoning with which Congress defines "open to the public" is
ultimately unresolved and the definition is left to wallow in illogic, an
abstruse standard unhelpful to students and courts alike. 63 In the
event a performance falls under neither the "transmission" nor the
"substantial number of persons" clauses, the 1976 Act leaves us in the
same position as the 1909 Act to determine whether that performance
is "open to the public." While we can be certain of the bright-line
boundaries of places never or always open to the public,64 the gray
area in between fosters contrary judicial decisionmaking that, in the
aggregate, reflects a general aura reminiscent of opinions like Wyatt
and Porter. A series of four opinions stresses the need for a compre-
hensive standard for public place analysis under the 1976 Act.
59 Courts seem to be in rough agreement that the threshold for publicness under
the "substantial number of persons" clause of 17 U.S.C. § 101 is twenty. See Fermata
Int'l Melodies, Inc. v. Champions Golf Club, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 1257, 1260 (S.D. Tex.
1989) ("The Court considers twenty-one members plus guests to be a 'substantial
number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family.'"); St. Nicholas Music, Inc.
v. D.V.W., Inc., No. Civ. C84-0307W, 1985 WL 9624 at *1 (D. Utah Feb. 20, 1985)
(holding that a gathering of twenty-three people constituted a public performance);
see also Daniel Cantor, How Many Guests May Attend a Wedding Reception Before ASCAP
Shows Up? Or, What Are the Limits of the Definition of Perform "Publicly" Under 17 U.S.C.
§ 101?, 27 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 79, 92 (2003) ("A performance for 100 wedding guests
would probably violate the 'substantial number of persons' sub-clause . . .because
more than twenty guests would probably be 'strangers,' which is 'a substantial number
of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances."').
60 17 U.S.C. § 101.
61 H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, pt. 1, at 64.
62 Id.
63 See, e.g., Joshua P. Binder, Current Developments of Public Performance Rights for
Sound Recordings Transmitted Online: You Push Play, but Who Gets Paid?, 22 Lov. L.A.
ENT. L. REV. 1, 8 (2001) (stating that "music performed at any place that is open to
the public is publicly performed"); see also Bruce P. Keller & Jeffrey P. Cunard, What
Rights Does a Copyright Owner Enjoy ?, in COPYRIGHT LAW: A PRACrITIONER'S GUIDE § 4:1
(Practising Law Inst. ed. 2001) (defining a place open to the public as "one that mem-
bers of the public could attend").
64 For example, renting a movie and enjoying it in the confines of one's own
home is certainly not a public performance, while inviting all of Pittsburgh to watch a
film on the Jumbotron at PNC Park is obviously a public performance.
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I. CASES EXPOSING THE NEED FOR A COMPREHENSIVE PUBLIC
PLACE STANDARD
A. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Redd Home, Inc.
In Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Redd Home, Inc.,65 the Third
Circuit illuminated the shortcomings of the 1976 Act in a factual situa-
tion that directly challenged the definition of "open to the public."
The setting for the copyright infringement dispute in Redd Home was
Maxwell's Video Showcase, Ltd. (Maxwell's), a facility that provided
in-store rentals for its customers. 6 6 The store's layout was simple: a
showroom in the front contained videos and video equipment for sale
or rent. The rear of the store housed an exhibition area, in which
patrons could view an assortment of videos on televisions "in small,
private booths [measuring approximately four feet by six feet] with
space for two to four people."67 The Redd Home court noted that
while Maxwell's was open to any member of the public, "[a]ccess to
each [booth was] limited to the individuals who rent it as a group.
Although no restriction is placed on the composition of a group,
strangers are not grouped in order to fill a particular room to capac-
ity."' 6 8 Each patron wishing to utilize one of the viewing rooms in the
facility simply selected a film from a list of available titles, and an em-
ployee placed the cassette into a player at the front of the store and
transmitted the film to the patron's viewing booth. 69 Based on the
contours of this space, the Redd Home court faced the issue of whether
the defendants' activities constituted a public performance of the
plaintiffs' motion pictures. The issue encompassed two questions:
Were the performances private, as the defendants urged, because they
were limited to the individuals within the confines of each private
booth? Or, were the performances public, as the plaintiffs contended,
because the premises were open to any member of the public who
wished to utilize its facilities or services?
At first blush, it seems as though the court in Redd Home should
never even have wrestled with this problem. Maxwell's employees cer-
tainly communicated these films by a device whereby images and
sounds were received beyond the place from which they were sent, so
it seems as though Redd Home, on its face, should have been summa-
rily dismissed as a public performance under the transmission clause.
65 749 F.2d 154 (3d Cir. 1984).
66 Id. at 156.
67 Id. at 157.
68 Id.
69 Id.
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While the court recognized the transmission clause as a basis for deci-
sion,70 it ultimately reasoned that the performances at issue transpired
in a public place. The court listed tenuous factors supporting its deci-
sion. First, the court noted that "[s] imply because the cassettes can be
viewed in private does not mitigate the essential fact that Maxwell's
[was] unquestionably open to the public."71 This argument, essen-
tially that the performances at issue were private but at a place open to
the public, is logical but unconvincing. Second, the court noted that
"[a] ny member of the public can view a motion picture by paying the
appropriate fee," and thus the "services provided by Maxwell's are es-
sentially the same as a movie theatre, with the additional feature of
privacy. ' 72 While the first half of this reasoning is sound, the second
point relies on tenuous logic, arguing that the performances were
public, albeit with the added element of privacy. Thus, while the per-
formances at issue in Redd Home were unquestionably public under
the transmission clause, the court decided to place the decision in the
hands of its public place analysis-an interpretation that is ultimately
unsatisfying.
B. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Aveco, Inc.
Only two years later, the Third Circuit was again confronted with
a copyright infringement suit turning on facts remarkably similar to
Redd Home. In Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Aveco, Inc.,73 the
plaintiffs, producers of motion pictures, sued the defendants, owners
of a video rental business, for allegedly infringing on their exclusive
right to publicly perform copyrighted works.74 Like the defendants in
Redd Home, the store owners in Aveco made available private rooms in
their facilities in which individuals could enjoy feature films. The de-
fendants insisted that "it rent[ed] its viewing rooms to individual cus-
tomers who .. . [were] joined in the room only by members of their
families and social acquaintances .... [The defendants'] stated prac-
tice [was] not to permit unrelated groups of customers to share a view-
ing room .... -75 Additionally, unlike Redd Home, the customers in
Aveco exercised complete control over the performance of a video. 76
70 Id. at 159 ("[T]he transmission of a performance to members of the public,
even in private settings such as hotel rooms or Maxwell's viewing rooms, constitutes a
public performance.").
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 800 F.2d 59 (3d Cir. 1986).
74 Id. at 61.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 62.
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Instead of an employee transmitting the film from a central site, cus-
tomers operated video cassette players located in each viewing
room. 7 7 Based on these facts, it is clear that the public performance
issue in Aveco could not be resolved by either the transmission or the
substantial number of persons clauses. Thus, the Aveco court was left
in the gray area of public place analysis and stripped of all but one
basis for decision-whether playing a copyrighted work in the private
room of a public establishment constituted a public performance
under 17 U.S.C. § 106.
Acknowledging the decision in Redd Home, the Aveco court re-
solved that such performances were indeed public for purposes of
copyright infringement analysis.78 The court certainly realized that
the customers exercised complete control over performances "closed
to other members of the public ... [and] in private screening rooms
... [that were] private during each rental period, and therefore, not
,open to the public."' 79 Nonetheless, the Aveco court held that these
performances were public.8 0 The decision rested on a "nature of the
place" standard derived from a portion of the Redd Home analysis.
That is, the availability of the private rooms to any member of the
public rendered each private room, in theory, a public space.81 The
Aveco court analogized the situation to telephone booths and pay toi-
lets, both of which are commonly regarded as being open to the pub-
lic.8 2 On a purely theoretical level, while the reasoning in Aveco
essentially echoes Redd Home, it is intellectually more satisfying than
the chaotic analysis in that case.
C. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Professional Real Estate
Investors, Inc.
The two aforementioned lines of attack are, at least implicitly,
taken up in Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Professional Real Estate
Investors, Inc.,8s a Ninth Circuit opinion affirmatively establishing that
even after Redd Home and Aveco, public place analysis is still
unresolved.
The plaintiffs, ever the vigilant copyright enforcers, filed suit after
learning that the defendants, operators of a hotel resort, allowed
77 Id. at 61.
78 Id. at 64.
79 Id. at 63.
80 Id. at 61.
81 Id. at 63.
82 Id.
83 866 F.2d 278 (9th Cir. 1989).
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guests to rent videodiscs from the gift shop for viewing in their indi-
vidual rooms.84 Guests simply went to the lobby gift shop, paid a daily
fee for a disc, and retired to their room to watch the film on a large
screen projection television.8 5 Factually, Professional Real Estate Inves-
tors is similar to Aveco, in that both involve owner-controlled video per-
formances in private rooms on public premises. Based on this
similarity, Aveco arguably controls this situation, regardless of the fact
that Professional Real Estate Investors involved a hotel and Aveco con-
cerned a video rental store. That is, the reasoning in Aveco purports
to transcend such differences, for if a private room is "available to any
member of the public with the inclination to avail himself [of the
space] ,"86 any performance taking place therein is considered public.
Certainly, a hotel room is open to any member of the public who
desires to avail himself of the space, so it follows that under Aveco, the
performance in Professional Real Estate Investors should be public.
The Ninth Circuit, however, disagreed, maintaining that "[t]he
plain language and the legislative history [of the statute] lead us to
conclude that hotel guest rooms are not 'public.' 8 7 The court rested
its reasoning on two principles. First, like the Third Circuit, the Ninth
Circuit employed a "nature of the place" standard, albeit in a slightly
modified form. Instead of simply using the standard to classify a place
as public or private, the court considered the "nature of the place" to
be defined by how it derives its primary economic benefit. Thus, the
Ninth Circuit opined that the defendant's operation differed from
those in Redd Home and Aveco because "its 'nature' is the providing of
living accommodations and general hotel services, which may inciden-
tally include the rental of videodiscs to interested guests for viewing in
guest rooms."88 Based on this consideration, the court shifted its fo-
cus from the hotel generally to the individual guest room. Thus,
"[w]hile the hotel may indeed be 'open to the public,"' the court ar-
gued, "a guest's hotel room, once rented, is not."8 9
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the hotel room was private
from the perspective of its occupant, noting that "guest rooms [are]
places where individuals enjoy a substantial degree of privacy, not un-
like their own homes."90 As authority for this position, the court cited
the proposition that individuals are afforded constitutional protection
84 Id. at 279.
85 Id.
86 Aveco, 800 F.2d at 63.
87 Prof I Real Estate Developers, 866 F.2d at 280.
88 Id. at 281.
89 Id.
90 Id.
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from unreasonable searches and seizures in hotel rooms. 9 1 Contrary
to Aveco, the court in Professional Real Estate Investors determined that,
given the nature of the place and the occupant's expectation of a sub-
stantial degree of privacy, private rooms in public places, at least inso-
far as hotels are concerned, are not "open to the public" for purposes
of copyright infringement analysis. 92
D. Video Views, Inc. v. Studio 21, Ltd.
After Redd Home, Aveco, and Professional Real Estate Investors, pub-
lic place analysis, at least in the gray area between places always private
and always public, seemed to rest at an impasse. The apparent dis-
cord between these differing views was further exacerbated as the Sev-
enth Circuit joined the fray in Video Views, Inc. v. Studio 21, Ltd.93
The space at issue in Video Views was an adult entertainment busi-
ness that contained on its premises six video arcade booths, large
enough to accommodate between one and six people. 94 Customers
viewed adult films by informing employees which video they desired
and purchasing tokens which allowed them to view five-minute seg-
ments of their selection. 9 5 The plaintiffs, recognizing the factual simi-
larity between this situation and Redd Home and Aveco, cited those
opinions as express authority for the position that the adult book
store violated their exclusive right to publicly perform their videos. 96
The defendants, on the other hand, cited Professional Real Estate Inves-
tors for the proposition that the Ninth Circuit had authoritatively
changed the law as expounded in Redd Home and Aveco.9 7 Thus, Video
Views pitted the Third Circuit against the Ninth Circuit, thereby leav-
ing the Seventh Circuit to take sides in an open conflict on the issue
of whether performances in private rooms on public premises consti-
tute public performances as contemplated under the 1976 Act.
91 Id. (citing Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 490 (1964)).
92 Id. at 281.
93 925 F.2d 1010 (7th Cir. 1991).
94 Id. at 1019.
95 Id. at 1012. It is unclear from the facts as recited in the opinion whether the
video was transmitted by an employee from a central location. The court did not
address this issue in its decision, deciding instead to focus on the issue of whether
videos shown in private booths on premises open to the public are public perform-
ances under 17 U.S.C. § 106. Id. at 1019.
96 Id. at 1019.
97 Id. ("Studio 21 contends that there has been a change in the law since the time
of trial, citing [Professional Real Estate Investors]. It suggests that we are obligated to
apply the 'new' law on this appeal . . . .") (citation omitted).
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The Video Views court expressly sided with the Third Circuit, hold-
ing that "[w]e find that Professional Real Estate Investors did not
'change' the law .... To the extent that [it] may be viewed to contra-
dict the rule established by Redd Home and Aveco, we decline to follow
it."98 The court proceeded to simply look to the nature of the prem-
ises as a whole, concluding that because adult book stores are places
where the public is openly invited, any performance taking place
therein is necessarily public as well. 99
III. RECONCILIATION: TOWARD A UNIFORM PUBLIC PLACE STANDARD
UNDER THE COPYRIGHT ACT oF 1976
The holdings in Redd Home, Aveco, Professional Real Estate Investors,
and Video Views have left many commentators scratching their heads,
finally concluding that the decisions are ultimately irreconcilable.1 0 0
Indeed, the situation would appear hopeless. From a purely theoreti-
cal perspective, it is inconceivable that the Ninth Circuit recognizes
precisely what the Third and Seventh Circuits deny: that private spaces
can exist in public places. Confusing the matter even more, the rea-
soning in one decision seems particularly applicable to the others,
thereby providing a quandary without a clearly defined solution.
Fortunately, these decisions are far more instructive than they
might first appear. The solution requires, as one might expect, a
change in perspective, as any one of these four decisions does not
itself conclusively resolve the public place problem. Instead, one must
approach each individual opinion as an important assignment in a
larger lesson. That is, Redd Home, Aveco, and Professional Real Estate
Investors each provide one principle that assists public place analysis
toward realizing its full potential. By arranging the significant con-
cepts from each decision, then, one may construct a three-pronged
public place standard that not only resolves apparent discrepancies
between cases arising under the 1976 Act, but provides a method by
which jurists may surmount similar challenges in the future. Each ele-
ment may be resolved in favor of finding either a private space or
public place, with the resulting majority controlling the outcome.
The three factors for public place analysis are:
98 Id. at 1020.
99 Id.
100 See, e.g., Gayle E. Coleman, Copyright and Videos: Current Trends in the Right of
Public Performance, FLA. B.J., Apr. 1992, at 46 ("The courts are divided on the factors
which constitute 'public performance,' particularly as it relates to the viewing of
videos .... ); Kheit, supra note 56, at 5 ("[T]he definition of what constitutes a
public place is unsettled; the courts splinter somewhat haphazardly when construing
the metes and bounds of a public place with regard to public performances.").
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(1) whether the immediate space in which the performance takes
place affords its occupant a reasonable expectation of privacy;
(2) whether the individual (or individuals) witnessing the perform-
ance controls that performance, or whether that individual (or
individuals) lacks control over the performance; and
(3) whether the nature of the place in which the performance takes
place is generally used for the purpose of enjoying such per-
formances, or whether the performance is incidental to the
overall function of the enterprise.
A. A Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
The first issue to be determined under the test is whether the
immediate space in which the performance takes place affords the
occupant a reasonable expectation of privacy. This factor, derived
from Professional Real Estate Investors, is conceptually the simplest ele-
ment of the public place standard and, therefore, the logical starting
point for public place analysis.
The pervasiveness of a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
factual setting of Professional Real Estate Investors was, for Judge
O'Scannlain, a determinative element in finding a private perform-
ance on public premises. 10 1 While noting that the hotel in general is
open to the public, he looked to the immediate confines in which the
disputed performances took place, surroundings that afforded the oc-
cupant a substantial degree of privacy. 10 2 The privacy determination
is premised on two factors. First, a guest in a hotel room is entitled to
constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures. 10 3 Second, common experience dictates that hotel rooms
are "places where individuals enjoy a substantial degree of privacy, not
unlike their own homes."'1 4 Based on the Ninth Circuit's analysis,
then, the first element of the standard takes shape. Regardless of
whether the premises are public, the scales lean against finding a pub-
lic performance if the immediate confines of the space in which the
101 See Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Prof l Real Estate Investors, Inc., 866 F.2d
278, 281 (9th Cir. 1989) ("The movies are viewed exclusively in guest rooms, places
where individuals enjoy a substantial degree of privacy, not unlike their own homes").
102 Id.
103 Id. ("No less than a tenant of a house, or the occupant in a boarding house, a
guest in a hotel room is entitled to constitutional protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures.") (citations omitted). The court cited Stoner v. California, 376
U.S. 483, 490 (1964), a case addressing the scope of a permissible search under the
Fourth Amendment, for this point.
104 ProflI Real Estate Investors, 866 F.2d at 281.
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disputed performance takes place prompt a reasonable expectation of
privacy.
Professional Real Estate Investors underscores the importance of an
expectation of privacy (or lack thereof) to public place analysis, but
what is the standard to apply in making this determination? The opin-
ion mentions Fourth Amendment decisions as instructive. 10 5 Indeed,
given their emphasis on privacy, Fourth Amendment cases define a
sound measure for determining whether a particular place affords an
individual a "reasonable expectation of privacy" for purposes of public
place analysis under the 1976 Act.10 6 The U.S. Supreme Court, in
Minnesota v. Olson,10 7 provides just such a useful standard. Justice
White, writing for the Court, held that an individual may legitimately
expect privacy in a place if "society is prepared to recognize [that ex-
pectation] as reasonable."']0 8
In sum, then, the first prong of public place analysis under the
1976 Act is whether a space affords its occupant a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy. That determination must be made, in turn, by shifting
the focus from the place to the individual to establish whether society,
based on common experience, deems legitimate his or her expecta-
tion of privacy therein. If so, the first element of public place analysis
weighs toward finding a private performance and no infringement of
the public performance right. If not, this factor shifts the inquiry to-
ward finding a public place and, therefore, copyright infringement.
B. The Extent to Which the Individual Controls the Performance
Having completed a preliminary analysis of the space in which
the performance takes place, the second determination to be made is
the extent to which the performance of a particular work is controlled
by the individual(s) witnessing that performance. This factor, lifted
from Aveco, involves an elaborate inquiry that requires further
explanation.
105 See id. at 281 (citing Stoner, 376 U.S. at 483).
106 See id. (referencing the Fourth Amendment's "reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy" standard in analyzing whether a performance was "public" for purposes of fed-
eral copyright law).
107 495 U.S. 91 (1990).
108 Id. at 95-96 (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143-44 (1978)). Judge
O'Scannlain seems to rely on a similar standard in Professional Real Estate Investors, as
he appeals to common experience to determine whether a place affords an individual a
reasonable expectation of privacy. ProJ'l Real Estate Investors, 866 F.2d at 281 ("This
conclusion is further supported by common experience. [Hotel] guests do not view
the videodiscs in hotel meeting rooms used for large gatherings. The movies are
viewed exclusively in guest rooms . . ").
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Although the holding in Aveco seems to rest primarily on adher-
ence to the Redd Home decision,' 0 9 Judge Stapleton's opinion reveals
that the element of control should be a significant factor in public
place analysis. 110 Aveco's factual scenario reflects two factors that
weigh toward finding a private performance that does not infringe on
the plaintiff's copyright. First, "the viewing room was closed to other
members of the public." ' Second, "Aveco's customers are the ones
performing the works, for it is they who actually place the video cas-
sette in the video cassette player and operate the controls."' 12 While
the court mentions control as a factor that bears on public place anal-
ysis, it fails to provide the attendant justification.
Understanding the importance of control to public place analysis
requires spatial thinking. When an individual (or group of individuals
not falling under the "substantial number of persons" clause) exer-
cises complete control over a performance of a particular work, no
other member of the public can be said to have been involved in that
performance. That is, the causal boundaries of that particular per-
formance are drawn narrowly, prior to implicating any member of the
public. When an individual (or group of individuals not falling under
the "substantial number of persons" clause) does not exercise com-
plete control over the performance of a particular work, however, the
causal boundaries of that performance are ductile, allowing for the
possibility that a member of the public is involved. In sum, when an
individual does not exercise complete control in taking in the per-
formance of a particular work, that performance tends to be public, as
members of the public constitute a link in the chain of causation. If
the individual exercises complete control over the performance of a
particular work, however, the chain of causation necessarily excludes
members of the general public, thereby weighing against finding a
public performance.
This reasoning provided the basis for decision in Cohen v. Para-
mount Pictures Corp.,1" 3 a dispute centered on whether the defendant
could reproduce a musical composition in videocassettes under a li-
cense permitting it to perform a musical composition at "places of
109 See Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Aveco, Inc., 800 F.2d 59, 63 (3d Cir. 1986)
("Because we find Redd Home indistinguishable from the case at bar, we find that
Aveco's operations constituted an authorization of public performances of [the plain-
tiff's] copyrighted works.").
110 See, e.g., Kheit, supra note 56, at 39-41 (recognizing that Aveco suggests that a
lack of recipient control weighs towards finding a public performance).
111 Aveco, 800 F.2d at 63.
112 Id. at 62.
113 845 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1988).
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public entertainment."' 14 The defendant asserted that reproduction
in videocassettes was permissible because it was equivalent to broad-
casting the composition on television, a "place of public entertain-
ment."11 5 Given that television and videocassettes are both viewed in
the home, the defendant's argument nullified space characteristics as
the determinative factor by which to distinguish reproductions for pri-
vate performances from those for public performances.
The court, however, used the issue of control to distinguish re-
productions for private performances, prohibited under the license,
from reproduction for public performances, permitted by the li-
cense. 1 6 Videocassettes are reproductions intended for private per-
formance, the court held, because "[v]ideocassette entertainment is
controlled within the home, at the viewer's complete discretion ...
[which] eliminate Es] the involvement of an intermediary, such as a
network." 117 On the contrary, the court held that duplicates intended
for television are reproductions for public performance because
"[t] he menu of entertainment appearing on television is controlled
entirely by [an] intermediary and, thus, . . . beyond the viewer's
grasp."118
Barred from relying on the qualities of the space in which future
performances would take place, the court used the aforementioned
reasoning to recognize that the extent to which the viewer controls a
performance is effective in distinguishing private from public
performances. 1i9
To this point, we have come to a basic understanding that con-
trol-the second element of the three-pronged test for public place
analysis-is a useful factor by which to distinguish public from private
performances. The last question to resolve is what standard to use in
identifying the extent that an individual exercises control over a given
performance. The issue is more easily resolved if the question is
phrased in the negative. More concretely, when can an individual rea-
sonably be said to lack control over the performance of a particular
work so as to implicate members of the public, thereby resolving the
issue in favor of finding a public performance?
Thankfully, while Aveco abandons the control inquiry at the point
of providing a justification, it rejoins the fray to supply an applicable
114 Id. at 853.
115 Television would be considered a public performance under the transmission
clause of the 1976 Act. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
116 Cohen, 845 F.2d at 854.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 See id.
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test for control, supported by the doctrine of contributory infringe-
ment.1 20 "Contributory infringement originated in tort and 'stems
from the notion that one who directly contributes to another's infringe-
ment should be held accountable.'"121 Based on this definition, then,
contributory infringement and the control prong of public place anal-
ysis are conceptually related, as both seek to define a chain of causa-
tion for the performance of a copyrighted work to establish whether
the links extend to one individual or several parties. Tailoring the
contributory infringement standard to public place analysis, an indi-
vidual lacks control over a performance if another party induces,
causes, or materially contributes to the disputed performance. 122
In sum, the extent to which an individual controls the perform-
ance of a copyrighted work is an influential element in the three-
pronged test for public place analysis. If, under the standard articu-
lated here, the individual is deemed to exercise control over a per-
formance, this prong should be resolved in favor of a private
performance; if, however, the individual does not control a perform-
ance, the factor emphasizes a public quality of the performance.
C. The Nature of the Place
The third and final element of the three-part public place stan-
dard involves establishing whether the "nature of the place where the
performance takes place .. .is generally used for the purpose of en-
joying performances."' 23 If the place is generally used to enjoy per-
formances, this factor will be resolved in support of finding a public
performance. 124 If the disputed performance is merely incidental to
the principal operations of the enterprise, this factor will be resolved
in favor of finding a private performance.
120 Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Aveco, Inc., 800 F.2d 59, 62 (3d Cir. 1986)
(citing RCA Records v. All-Fast Sys., Inc., 594 F. Supp. 335 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Italian
Book Corp. v. Palms Sheepshead Country Club, Inc., 186 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 326
(E.D.N.Y. 1975)).
121 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 243 F. Supp. 2d 1073,
1089 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (quoting Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259,
264 (9th Cir. 1996)).
122 This standard is modified from the contributory infringement standard set
forth by Professors Nimmer: "A party 'who, with knowledge of the infringing activity,
induces, causes, or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another, may
be held liable as a 'contributory infringer.'" 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 8,
§ 12.04 [A] [2] [a] (citing Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443
F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971)).
123 Kheit, supra note 56, at 28.
124 Id.
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While the analytical leap from "business purpose" to "public
place" may seem somewhat arbitrary, it is the only element of public
place analysis inhering in all four of the aforementioned decisions
(Redd Home, Aveco, Professional Real Estate Investors, and Video Views).
Upon further analysis, this "nature of the place" factor makes perfect
sense.
The "nature of the place" standard was first pronounced, albeit
rather coarsely, in Redd Home.125 While the court did not refine the
standard to its current incarnation, the controlling theory behind the
holding in the case was that "'the showcasing operation is not distin-
guishable in any significant manner from the exhibition of films at a
conventional movie theater.' ... The charges or fees received for view-
ing the cassettes at [the facility] are analytically indistinguishable from
admission fees paid by patrons to gain admission to any public
theater."126
By emphasizing that the principal purpose of the facility was to
house the performance of videocassettes, the court shifted the focus
of its inquiry to the entire facility, thereby resolving the "nature of the
place" element in favor of finding a public performance. 2 7
Using Redd Home as the stimulus for its decision, Aveco refined
the "nature of the place" analysis, stating that "[o]ur opinion in Redd
Home turned not on the precise whereabouts of the video cassette
players, but on the nature of [the facilities] ."128 Although Aveco's cus-
tomers viewed videos in private screening rooms, the court overcame
this presumption of privacy because Aveco derived its primary eco-
nomic benefit from such performances. Thus, the "nature of the
place" analysis shifted back to the entire facility, which was a public
place because "Aveco[ I was willing to make a viewing room and video
cassette available to any member of the public with the inclination to
avail himself of this service." 129
The "nature of the place" standard also played a significant role
in Professional Real Estate Investors. Like Redd Home and Aveco, the
125 See Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Redd Horne, Inc., 749 F.2d 154, 159 (3d
Cir. 1984) (arguing that because the business was organized primarily for the enjoy-
ment of performances, "[t]he services provided by Maxwell's are essentially the same
as a movie theatre.").
126 Id. at 159-60 (quoting Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Redd Horne Inc., 568
F. Supp. 494, 500 (W.D. Pa. 1983)).
127 Id. at 159 ("The relevant 'place' within the meaning of section 101 is each of
Maxwell's two stores, not each individual booth within each store.").
128 Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Aveco, Inc., 800 F.2d 59, 63 (3d Cir. 1986)
(emphasis added).
129 Id.
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space in which the video performances took place created an initial
presumption of privacy.130 Unlike those decisions, however, the court
did not shift the inquiry back to the entire hotel facility.1 3' One of the
principal justifications for keeping the analysis focused on a single
room was that "[the hotel's] operation differ[ed] from those in Aveco
and Redd Home because its 'nature' is the providing of living accom-
modations and general hotel services, which may incidentally include
the rental of videodiscs to interested guests for viewing in guest
rooms."13 2 As the enterprise at issue in Professional Real Estate Investors
was not organized for the sole purpose of housing performances, the
"nature of the place" standard weighed against finding a public
performance.
Finally, Video Views, factually similar to Redd Home and Aveco,
adopted the reasoning in those decisions pertaining to the resolution
of the "nature of the place" factor. 3 3 The court acknowledged that
"the proper inquiry is directed to the nature of the place in which the
private video booths are located .... ,,134 As the enterprise at issue
derived its primary financial benefits from "providing its customers
with the opportunity to view on its premises films that had been li-
censed to [the plaintiff] ,"' 35 the court directed the "nature of the
place" analysis to the entire facility, resolving that this standard
pointed toward a public performance of the plaintiffs films. 3 6
While it is apparent from these decisions that the nature of the
place is a significant factor in public place analysis, they provide no
principled reasoning why this should be so. The answer lies in the
economic policy behind the public performance right. From the
eighteenth through the twenty-first centuries, it has been well recog-
nized that one rationale for the rights bundled within a given copy-
right is to secure the financial interests of inventors and authors so as
to stimulate creative endeavors for the good of society.13 7 The "nature
130 Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Prof'l Real Estate Investors, Inc., 866 F.2d
278, 281 (9th Cir. 1989) (noting that "a guest's hotel room, once rented, is not [open
to the public]").
131 Id. (concentrating the public performance analysis exclusively on an individual
guest room).
132 Id.
133 See Video Views, Inc. v. Studio 21, Ltd., 925 F.2d 1010, 1020 (7th Cir. 1991)
(declaring that "[w]e agree with the rationale of both Redd Home and Aveco").
134 Id.
135 Id. at 1013.
136 Id. at 1020.
137 Compare Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909) (repealed 1976)
(affording authors a copyright for the "legal security of the fruits of their study and
industry"), with Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d
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of the place" standard is rationally related to this goal, as it is a means
by which fruits derived from the performance of a work are secured
for its owner. Roger W. Wallach describes the "nature of the place"
standard as a means by which to determine whether the copyright
owner is losing proceeds from market expenditures for its product.
He deftly identifies the relationship as follows:
By inquiring whether the copyright holder is losing proceeds from
market expenditures from its product, one can easily distinguish
[Professional Real Estate Investors] from Redd Home and Aveco. The
consumer who considers leaving home to watch a movie chooses
between video stores with booths-as in Redd Home and Aveco--and
a public theater, which pays a public performance royalty. Con-
versely, the consumer who decides to rent a movie on a supplied
videodisc player chooses between the hotel's selection and that of a
local video store, which pays no public performance royalty. The
copyright holder therefore loses money if video stores with booths
do not pay the public performance royalty that public theaters
pay.138
The "nature of the place" standard thus ensures that the copy-
right holder is receiving the financial benefits to which he is entitled.
Wallach's analysis identifies an economic rationale that both clarifies
and justifies the conclusion that under the "nature of the place" fac-
tor, performances taking place in private rooms are considered public
if the enterprise as a whole is organized to provide such
performances.
Under the "nature of the place" prong of the public place stan-
dard, if an enterprise exists primarily to provide performances of the
type in dispute, the factor is resolved in favor of publicness, regardless
of whether the actual performance took place in a private room. If
the performance in question is merely incidental to the overall func-
tion of the entire entity, however, the copyright holder is not being
deprived of any financial benefit, and the factor should be resolved in
support of privacy.
IV. RESOLUTION AND APPLICATION
The individual factors comprising the standard for public place
analysis are each capable of resolution in favor of finding either a pub-
1381, 1399 (6th Cir. 1996) (echoing even the earliest copyright statutes by declaring
that the "protection of the financial interests of inventors and authors" forms one of
the bases of copyrights).
138 Roger W. Wallach, Not in Public! The Ninth Circuit Devises a Two-Step Test for
Public Performances Under the Copyright Act, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 203, 211-12 (1990) (foot-
notes omitted).
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lic or a private performance. After each element is applied and its
proper outcome determined in light of a particular set of facts, the
majority of factors-public or private-point toward the proper out-
come. The utility of this three-pronged test is evident in its ability to
reconcile the conflicting holdings in Redd Home, Aveco, Professional
Real Estate Investors, and Video Views.
A. Redd Home Under the Public Place Standard
Although the Redd Home performance is necessarily "public"
under the transmission clause of the 1976 Act, the application of the
public place standard developed in this Note reaches the same
conclusion.
First, although the court suggested that the individual booths in
which the performances took place were private, under the test for a
"reasonable expectation of privacy" as articulated here, it is highly un-
likely that society would recognize the occupants' expectation of pri-
vacy therein as legitimate. Professors Nimmer provide ample
justification for this conclusion, likening the situation in Redd Home to
an "old-fashioned penny arcade, where a short motion picture se-
quence might be seen in a coin-operated 'peep show' device." 13
9
Based on this analogy, they conclude that "[i] t would be strange, in-
deed, to conclude that these were private performances simply be-
cause only one person at a time observed each such performance.1 4 °
Professors Nimmers' reasoning is intuitively correct. Based on com-
mon experience with such devices, it is patently unreasonable to con-
clude that such performances offer the viewer a reasonable
expectation of privacy simply because the eyepiece on such machines
limits the performance to a single person. Taking Professors Nim-
mers' analogy as true, then, the booths in Redd Home could not afford
their occupants a reasonable expectation of privacy. Thus, the first
prong of the three-part public place standard favors finding a public
performance.
Second, the patrons in Redd Home exercised no control over the
disputed performances. 141 Instead, the customer chose a film from a
catalogue at the front of the store. 142 "Closing the door of the viewing
139 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 8, § 8.14[C] [3].
140 id.
141 See Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Redd Horne, Inc., 749 F.2d 154, 157 (3d
Cir. 1984) (observing that "[a] n employee of Maxwell's then places the cassette of the
motion picture chosen by the viewer into one of the video cassette machines in the
front of the store and [transmits] the picture . . .to the patron's viewing room").
142 See id. (describing how "[t]he customer selects a film from a catalogue which
contains the tites of available films").
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room activate [d] a signal in the counter area at the front of the store.
An employee ... then place [d] the cassette... into one of the video
cassette machines .. .and the picture [was] transmitted to the pa-
tron's viewing room. 1 43 Under the control standard developed in
this Note, the employees in Redd Home materially contributed to the
disputed performances, thereby stripping the patrons of control.
Thus, because the chain of causation for each performance impli-
cated members of the public, this factor is resolved in support of a
public performance.
Finally, the places at which the performances in Redd Home took
place were organized for the purposes of providing such perform-
ances.144 Although the stores sold and rented videocassettes, they
contained a total of eighty-five booths for in-store performances. 145
The nature of the place was to provide performances of the kind dis-
puted in the principal litigation and this factor is resolved toward find-
ing a public performance.
Even if the performances in Redd Home were not public under
the transmission clause of the 1976 Act, the public place standard as
developed in this Note would lead to the same conclusion, as all three
factors weigh toward finding a public performance.
B. Aveco Under the Public Place Standard
Aveco is easily resolved under the three-pronged public place stan-
dard because it simply presents a different wrinkle of the Redd Home
facts. Although the lack of transmission in Aveco alters the analysis
somewhat, the result is still, as the court found, a public
performance. 146
First, the booths in Aveco are indistinguishable from those in Redd
Horn e.147 Given Professors Nimmers' analysis, the Aveco booths, like
those in Redd Home, could not afford their occupants a reasonable
expectation of privacy. The "reasonable expectation of privacy"
prong, then, must be resolved in support of a public performance.
The second factor in the public place standard, the element of
control, is where the public place analysis in Aveco departs from that
in Redd Home. Unlike in Redd Home, the cassettes in Aveco were per-
143 Id.
144 See id. at 159 (holding that "[t]he services provided by Maxwell's are essentially
the same as a movie theatre, with the additional feature of privacy").
145 Id. at 156-57.
146 Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Aveco, Inc., 612 F. Supp. 315, 320 (M.D. Pa.
1985), affJd, 800 F.2d 59 (3d Cir. 1986).
147 Id. at 319 ("[W]e see no difference between [the premises in Aveco and Redd
Home].").
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formed by the customers themselves, without any assistance or inter-
ference from store employees. 148 The test for control under the
public place standard-whether another party induced, caused, or
materially contributed to the disputed performance-provides that
the patrons in Aveco completely controlled the videocassette perform-
ances. As a result, the second prong of the analysis must be resolved
in favor of a private performance.
Third, the nature of the place inquiry leans toward finding a pub-
lic performance. The stores at issue in Aveco were constructed for the
primary purpose of affording customers the opportunity to view video-
cassettes on the premises. The performances were not merely inci-
dental to the operation of the enterprise, and the third prong of the
public place standard must be resolved in support of a public
performance.
Although similar to Redd Home, the performance in Aveco was
controlled by patrons, thereby requiring modification of the public
place analysis. This adjustment necessarily impacts the resolution of
the control element, but on the whole, the factors inhering in the
comprehensive public place standard support the court's decision, as
their resolution weighs toward finding a public performance.
C. Professional Real Estate Investors Under the Public Place Standard
The facts detailed in Professional Real Estate Investors lend them-
selves to an uncomplicated resolution toward a private performance
under the public performance standard articulated in this Note.
First, the disputed performances took place in individual hotel
rooms. The court's reasoning makes common sense and supports
one's natural inclination-that the occupants of these rooms could
legitimately expect a substantial degree of privacy therein.1 49 Given
the test for a reasonable expectation of privacy that comprises the first
inquiry under the public place standard, this factor must be resolved
toward finding a private performance.
Second, it is readily apparent from the factual synopsis that hotel
guests exercised complete control over the performances in question.
In order to watch a film, each guest had to visit the hotel lobby, pay a
rental fee, take the videodisc back to his or her room, and personally
place it in the videodisc player. 5t The hotel, in no way contributing
148 Id.
149 Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Prof'l Real Estate Investors, Inc., 866 F.2d
278, 281 (9th Cir. 1989).
150 Id. at 279. "Hotel employees [were] available upon request to answer ques-
tions by guests about operating the in-room equipment." Id. While employee assis-
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to the disputed performance, thus failed the "material contribution"
test. Hotel guests retain control over each performance, thereby shift-
ing the control element of the public place standard toward a private
performance.
Finally, the Professional Real Estate Investors court provides a thor-
ough analysis of the "nature of the place" inquiry. Judge O'Scannlain
notes that the purpose of the hotel as an enterprise is not to provide
an opportunity for guests to view videodiscs, but rather to provide liv-
ing accommodations and general hotel services. 151 As the perform-
ances forming the basis of the plaintiff's complaint were merely
incidental to the overall operation of the hotel, the inquiry under the
"nature of the place" prong is disposed of in support of a private
performance.
Given this factual scenario, each element of the public perform-
ance standard is resolved in favor of finding a private performance
that did not infringe on the plaintiffs copyright. Thus, while the test
endorses the decisions in Redd Home and Aveco, it also supports the
holding in Professional Real Estate Investors. Video Views is correct, then,
in arguing that the Ninth Circuit did not change the law, for its deci-
sion is entirely consistent with it.
D. Video Views Under the Public Place Standard
As the circumstances surrounding the dispute in Video Views were
strikingly similar to Redd Home and Aveco, it is sensible that the three
factors comprising the public place standard should dictate the same
result.
First, the six video arcade booths in Video Views corresponded to
similar booths in Redd Home and Aveco. As applied to Video Views,
therefore, Professors Nimmers' argument assumes the same analytical
force it exhibits under factually similar conditions. Thus, the booths
at issue in Video Views cannot be said to have afforded occupants a
reasonable expectation of privacy. This factor must be resolved to-
ward finding a public performance.
The question of control, the second inquiry under the public
place standard, presents an interesting issue under Video Views's facts.
To view a particular film, the customer purchased a token which enti-
tance in some instances may have resulted in material contribution to a performance
that would resolve the control factor in favor of a public performance, this "public"
factor would consistently be outweighed by the two "private" factors, which remain
constant regardless of control. The conclusion would thus remain unaffected.
151 Id. at 281.
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tied him or her to view five minutes of a selection. 52 While patrons
did not exercise complete control over the performance, as did the
hotel guest in Professional Real Estate Investors, they did not completely
lack control over the performance like the customers in Redd Home.
From the court's vague recitation of the facts on this issue, it is diffi-
cult to determine whether the performances were transmitted,
whether another party provided material contribution, or whether the
individual in the booth was solely responsible. 153 The court, however,
mentions that prior to entering the booths, customers informed em-
ployees of the selection that they wanted to view. 154 It would logically
appear that this situation is analogous to Redd Home, and employees
in Video Views, therefore, materially contributed to the performances
in question. Given this conclusion, the control inquiry of public place
analysis must be resolved in favor of finding a public performance.
Finally, the nature of the place, as defined by the court, is to "pro-
vide.., customers with the opportunity to view adult films in viewing
rooms located on premises."'155 The adult bookstore in Video Views is,
like the stores in Redd Home and Aveco, organized primarily to house
performances of the type in dispute. Accordingly, the third prong of
the three-part public place test tends to favor finding a public
performance.
Directed to the facts provided in Video Views, the three factors
comprising the public place test unanimously point to a public per-
formance. Redd Home, Aveco, Professional Real Estate Investors, and
Video Views are ostensibly incongruous decisions. The three-pronged
public place standard articulated in this Note, however, proves that all
four decisions are essentially guided by an unstated theory.
CONCLUSION
The comprehensive standard for public place analysis defined
over the course of this Note is more than simply an organizing tem-
plate for four apparently contrasting opinions. It is a uniform stan-
dard for public place analysis applicable to any copyright dispute in
which the "publicness" of a performance is disputed.
152 Video Views, Inc. v. Studio 21, Ltd., 925 F.2d 1010, 1012 (7th Cir. 1991).
153 This situation may be analogized to Professional Real Estate Investors, wherein
there is a possibility that another party could materially contribute to the disputed
performances. Like the public place analysis in that situation, the control element in
Video Views is ineffectual, as the other two factors-each public-remain constant and
control the determination.
154 Video Views, 925 F.2d at 1012.
155 Id.
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Moreover, in the framework proposed by this Note, public place
analysis should function to ensure satisfactory results by guaranteeing
that several perspectives are represented in the estimation. The pri-
vacy element analyzes the situation based on common sense reasoning
and experience. The control factor ensures that the intellect is prop-
erly represented. Finally, the nature of the place standard evaluates
the scenario through the lens of the policy underlying copyright law.
By appealing to these three constituencies, the public place standard
assures a fundamentally sound conclusion.
EPILOGUE
We last left Harry Christmas in his cell at the federal penitentiary
in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, contemplating what went wrong. All he
wanted was Dinner and a Movie, yet he got fried mush and pinstripes.
What could Harry have done differently to avoid this fate?
Under the three-pronged public place test, the problem with Din-
ner and a Movie wasn't the nature of the place. While Harry certainly
hoped to provide his patrons with an enjoyable movie-watching expe-
rience, when looked at as a whole, the restaurant was primarily de-
signed to prepare and serve Harry's culinary wonders. The third
element of the analysis, then, leans toward finding private perform-
ances. Harry's problems, therefore, lay in the privacy and control ele-
ments of the analysis. At least one of the two factors would have to
have been resolved in favor of privacy to have kept Harry from chisel-
ing rocks.
Given the treatment that individual booths received in Redd
Home and Aveco, it is unlikely Harry could have argued that patrons
could reasonably expect privacy while watching movies at his restau-
rant. Even if he had closed off the ends of the booths so that only
customers could enter or exit, Professors Nimmers' "penny arcade"
analysis is not limited to the type of stores in Redd Home, Aveco, and
Video Views. The reasoning logically extends to individual booths in a
restaurant. It seems that no matter what Harry had done to close the
booths, movie buffs would have never been able to legitimately expect
privacy therein.
Harry was thus left to remedy the control factor, to swing the bal-
ance of the public place analysis toward private performances. Unfor-
tunately for Harry, handing control over to his patrons was a simple
task that he merely overlooked (although Harry would have aban-
doned his usual outgoing nature and the stroke of creative genius that
led to waiters serving movies on a silver platter as though they were
entrees). There are two ways Harry could have ensured that custom-
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ers retained control over the performances. First, he could have insti-
tuted a BYOM1 56 policy. Second, he could have simply placed all the
available videos on racks in the restaurant lobby, thereby allowing pa-
trons to select a DVD, take it to the table, and insert it into the player
themselves. Either solution would have shifted the determination of
the control inquiry toward finding a private performance. Doing so,
in turn, would have kept the disputed movie performances private.
Instead, poor Harry is in central Pennsylvania, muttering over
and over again that he "had to go to prison to become a criminal." 157
Now if you'll excuse me, I have a restaurant to open.
156 Bring Your Own Movie.
157 THE SHAWSHANK REDEMPTION (Castle Rock Entertainment 1994).
2004] 2077
2078 NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW [VOL. 79:5
